For years, the rule in the Tax Court was brutal. If you received a Collection Due Process determination and filed your petition on day 31, you were done. No excuses. The Tax Court said it simply had no jurisdiction. In Boechler, P.C. v. Commissioner, a unanimous Supreme Court said that rule was wrong.
The Facts
Boechler, P.C. is a law firm in Fargo, North Dakota. In 2015 the IRS notified it of a discrepancy in its tax filings. Boechler did not respond. The IRS assessed an "intentional disregard" penalty under the information return penalty rules in IRC § 6721 and sent a notice of intent to levy.
That got the firm's attention. It requested a Collection Due Process hearing before the IRS Independent Office of Appeals under § 6330(b), arguing that there was no discrepancy and that the penalty was excessive. Appeals sustained the levy.
Under § 6330(d)(1), Boechler had 30 days to petition the Tax Court. In the Court's words, Boechler "dropped the ball and filed its petition a day late." The Tax Court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding the deadline jurisdictional and therefore not subject to equitable tolling.
The Issue
Is the 30-day deadline in § 6330(d)(1) jurisdictional, and if not, can it be equitably tolled?
The Holding
Justice Barrett wrote for a unanimous Court: "Section 6330(d)(1)'s 30-day time limit to file a petition for review of a collection due process determination is an ordinary, nonjurisdictional deadline subject to equitable tolling." The Court reversed and remanded for the lower courts to decide whether Boechler actually deserved tolling.
The Reasoning
Why the label matters
A jurisdictional rule defines a court's power. It cannot be waived or forfeited, courts must raise it on their own, and it allows no equitable exceptions. A claim-processing rule just tells parties when to act. Because the consequences are so harsh, the Court treats a procedural requirement as jurisdictional "only if Congress 'clearly states' that it is."
The text is not clear
Section 6330(d)(1) says the person "may, within 30 days of a determination under this section, petition the Tax Court for review of such determination (and the Tax Court shall have jurisdiction with respect to such matter)." The IRS argued that "such matter" reached back to sweep in the 30-day deadline. Boechler argued it referred only to the petition for review. The Court found that "such matter" lacks a clear antecedent, that Boechler's reading had "a small edge" under the last-antecedent rule, and that other plausible readings did not tie jurisdiction to the deadline at all. Where multiple plausible readings exist and only one is jurisdictional, the jurisdictional reading is not clear.
Congress knew how to be clear elsewhere
The Court pointed to tax provisions enacted around the same time that do expressly link jurisdiction to a deadline, such as the interest abatement provision in § 6404(g)(1) and the innocent spouse petition provision in § 6015(e)(1)(A). Even § 6330(e)(1), right next door, says "[t]he Tax Court shall have no jurisdiction under this paragraph to enjoin any action or proceeding unless a timely appeal has been filed." That clarity, the Court said, "only highlights the lack of such clarity in §6330(d)(1)."
Old lower-court cases did not carry the day
The IRS argued Congress expected the CDP deadline to work like the 90-day deficiency deadline in § 6213(a), which lower courts had treated as jurisdictional. The Court called this the Commissioner's weakest argument, because those cases almost all predated the Court's effort to "bring some discipline" to the jurisdictional label.
Equitable tolling is presumed
Nonjurisdictional limitations periods are presumptively subject to equitable tolling. Nothing rebutted the presumption. The statute does not prohibit tolling, the short deadline is aimed at the taxpayer, and the CDP provisions are part of a scheme that is protective of taxpayers, where laypeople often start the process without lawyers.
Why Brockamp did not control
The IRS relied on United States v. Brockamp, which refused to equitably toll the refund claim deadline in § 6511. The Court distinguished it. Section 6511 is written in "unusually emphatic form," with detailed technical language, repeated limits and six express exceptions. Section 6330(d)(1) has none of that, and it has a single exception for bankruptcy in § 6330(d)(2). The CDP deadline also plays a "far more limited and ancillary role" in tax collection.
The Court was not moved by the IRS's concern about uncertainty. Petitions are already treated as filed when mailed under § 7502(a)(1), so "it is not as if the IRS can confidently rush to seize property on day 31 anyway."
What It Means for Taxpayers Today
Day 31 is not necessarily the end
If you missed the 30-day deadline to petition the Tax Court after a CDP determination, do not assume the case is over. You can file and ask the Tax Court to equitably toll the deadline. You will need facts that justify it. The Court did not say Boechler deserved tolling; it said tolling is available "in appropriate cases." Generally that means you were pursuing your rights diligently and something extraordinary stood in the way. Being busy is not enough.
Do not plan on tolling
The right answer is still to file on time. A CDP petition is one of the most valuable rights you have in collection. The Collection Due Process framework, discussed in our article on Collection Due Process hearings, lets an independent officer consider installment agreements, offers in compromise and hardship, and lets the Tax Court review the result. While the hearing and any appeal are pending, § 6330(e)(1) generally suspends the levy and the collection statute. Treat the 30 days as a hard wall, and treat Boechler as the emergency exit you hope you never need.
Mail it the right way
The Court pointed out that a petition is generally treated as filed when it is mailed under § 7502(a)(1). That rule protects you only if you can prove the mailing date. Send it by a method that gives you dated proof of mailing, keep the receipt with your file, and do not wait until the last afternoon.
Injunctions are different
One wrinkle survives. Section 6330(e)(1) expressly gives the Tax Court no jurisdiction to enjoin a levy unless a timely appeal was filed. If your petition is late and accepted only through tolling, the Court acknowledged you may not get that injunction from the Tax Court.
Other deadlines are judged one at a time
Boechler decided the CDP deadline. It does not automatically decide every other tax deadline. Each one turns on its own text, which is exactly why the Court contrasted § 6330(d)(1) with provisions like § 6015(e)(1)(A) and § 6404(g)(1). Do not assume another deadline is flexible because this one is.
The case started with an ignored letter
Do not miss the human lesson. Boechler's problem began when it did not respond to an IRS notice about a filing discrepancy. A response then might have prevented the penalty, the levy notice, the hearing and a trip to the Supreme Court.
The Bottom Line
Boechler took a deadline the IRS treated as an absolute bar and made it an ordinary deadline. That matters for the taxpayer who mailed a petition a day late because of a genuine emergency. It matters even more as a statement of how the Supreme Court now reads tax procedure: if Congress wants a deadline to strip a court of power, it has to say so clearly.